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by Diane Duros Hosfelt
Threats from the internet, particularly malicious software (i.e., malware) often use cryp-
tographic algorithms to disguise their actions and even to take control of a victim’s sys-
tem (as in the case of ransomware). Malware and other threats proliferate too quickly
for the time-consuming traditional methods of binary analysis to be effective. By au-
tomating detection and classification of cryptographic algorithms, we can speed program
analysis and more efficiently combat malware.
This thesis will present several methods of leveraging machine learning to automatically
discover and classify cryptographic algorithms in compiled binary programs.
While further work is necessary to fully evaluate these methods on real-world binary pro-
grams, the results in this paper suggest that machine learning can be used successfully
to detect and identify cryptographic primitives in compiled code. Currently, these tech-
niques successfully detect and classify cryptographic algorithms in small single-purpose
programs, and further work is proposed to apply them to real-world examples.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Detection and mitigation of malicious software (malware) is an evolving problem in the
security field. As researchers develop new techniques, malware authors improve their
ability to evade detection. One way they do this is by leveraging cryptovirology, where
they use cryptography to disguise certain activities [22].
Like any other class of malware, cryptoviruses can take many forms, such as malware
that logs user activity or installs malicious software. Recently, ransomware, where an
attacker holds a system captive and demands a ransom, has become prevalent. Recent
viruses, such as CryptoLocker, encrypt the user’s files, then direct them to pay a ransom
via Bitcoin. These viruses rely heavily on cryptography for their attacks.
CryptoLocker was discovered in September 2013, and by the time a solution was deliv-
ered to the public in August 2014, the virus had affected approximately 500,000 comput-
ers and extorted around $3 million [20]. For encryption, CryptoLocker used the public
key encryption scheme RSA with a 2048-bit key pair. Once the ransom had been paid,
the user received the private key for decryption (although this did not always occur).
International law enforcement agencies disrupted the command-and-control servers and
intercepted the database of private keys, which was made available to users in August
2014 [5].
Since CryptoLocker, ransomware has become increasingly popular. Other recent crypto
viruses are:
• CryptoWall: Andrea Allievi and Earl Carter from Cisco’s Talos group analyzed
CryptoWall 2.0. It uses The Onion Router (TOR) to protect communication with
the command and control channel and encrypts files using 2048-bit RSA [1].
1
2• TorrentLocker: iSIGHT Partners has analyzed this ransomware through a number
of iterations. It uses AES (Rijndael) encryption, with either 128, 192, or 256-bit
keys, and initially encrypted all files with the same key using Output Feedback
(OFB) mode. After this disclosure, the authors modified it to use Cipher-Block
Chaining (CBC) mode with different key streams [7].
• Critroni/Onion: Kaspersky Labs analyzed Onion and discovered that it compresses
files then encrypts them using AES with the hash SHA256. Decryption is only
possibly by using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with a master-private key,
stored on the authors’ server. All communication with this server is also protected
by ECDH with a different set of keys via TOR [2].
Due to the prevalence of cryptographic primitives in malware, researchers are interested
in efficiently reverse-engineering program binaries to detect crypto. This requires labor-
intensive manual analysis of the binaries, which does not scale well to the number of
emerging threats.
The goal of this thesis is to utilize machine learning to detect and classify cryptography
in small (single purpose) programs. This technique may then be extended to larger,
real-world examples by isolating the basic blocks (defined in chapter 2) of a program,
and applying it against each basic block. Previous work in this area relies on heuristics
[6][3]. Unlike heuristics, it is easy to update machine learning models as malware authors
evolve their evasion capabilities, and they will be more robust to obfuscation attempts.
Instead of constantly tweaking a heuristic or threshold based on new malware samples,
models can be re-trained with new data, which will scale better as malware continues
to proliferate.
The primary contributions of this thesis are:
• Providing a framework for generating machine learning models that detect and
classify cryptographic algorithms in binary programs
• Demonstrating that these models are successful when tested against single-purpose
binary programs
• Suggesting further work that will build upon the models presented and extend
them to successfully detect and classify crypto in larger (multipurpose) binary
programs.
In chapter 2, I will discuss related work and how it has formed the foundation for
this thesis. Chapter 3 details the methodology I used to extract features from binary
3programs in order to perform machine learning, which is then explored in chapter 4.
Finally, I evaluate the results of my experiments in chapter 5, and examine the limitations
in chapter 6, as well as proposing future work, before concluding in chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Related Work
Much of the previous work in this area builds on the field of automated protocol reverse-
engineering [[4],[11],[21]], where the application-level protocol is extracted without access
to the specification itself. Like the task of analyzing binary programs for cryptographic
primitives, protocol reverse-engineering is a time consuming manual task. In general,
the previous work has focused on creating domain-specific heuristics, instead of applying
general machine learning algorithms; however, machine learning has been used success-
fully to detect and classify malware.
2.1 Automated protocol reverse engineering
Previous work in this area has been split between static approaches and dynamic ap-
proaches. Static tools rely on signatures to determine if a particular implementation of
a cryptographic primitive is present in a binary sample. Wang et al. [19] were one of the
first groups to implement a dynamic approach using data lifetime analysis and dynamic
binary instrumentation (DBI) to identify when message decryption and processing occur,
and extract the decrypted message from memory.
Caballero et al. [3] refined this technique to automatically reverse engineer the MegaD
malware, which uses a custom encryption protocol to evade detection. The authors
identified a number of heuristics concerning loop detection and the ratio of bitwise
arithmetic instructions. In this case, they required 20 executions of a function that had
a ratio of at least 55% bitwise arithmetic instructions.
Lutz [14], cited by Caballero et al[3]., created a tool that automatically decrypts en-
crypted input received by malicious binaries, using dynamic analysis to extract features.
4
5This approach searches through the feature space to discover the location of the decryp-
tion routine and the decrypted input in system memory. He also noted the two features
of cryptographic code that this thesis (and Cabellero et al.) rely upon:
1. Cryptographic code uses a high ratio of bitwise arithmetic instructions
2. Cryptographic code contains loops (but they are an insufficient feature on their
own)
2.2 Classifying malware with machine learning
Kolter and Maloof[9] used machine learning to detect and classify malware executables.
They collected 1971 benign executables and 1651 malicious executables for the detection
task, as well as various virus loaders, worms, and Trojan horses for classification, then
converted each binary executable to a hexadecimal representation. For features, they
extracted n-grams from the hexadecimal strings, and approached the classification task
as a text classification problem.
They evaluated the performance of support vector machines (SVMs), naive Bayes, deci-
sion trees, and boosted classifiers, and determined that a boosted decision tree performed
the best in both the detection and classification tasks.
2.3 Detecting cryptographic primitives
Gro¨bert et al. [6] created three heuristics to detect cryptographic basic blocks: chains,
mnemonic-const, and verifier. The chains heuristic is based on the ordering of instruction
sequences. The authors compiled a database of known instruction sequences generated
from different open-source crypto implementations, which they then compared to se-
quences found in an unknown sample.
The mnemonic-const heuristic combines the chains heuristic with an examination of
constants. They noted that each algorithm contains unique tuples, which they consider
characteristic for the algorithm. They check for patterns using the chains heuristic, then
intersect the results with those of the characteristic tuples.
The verifier heuristic confirms a relationship between the input and output of a permuta-
tion box using memory reconstruction. This allows the authors to reconstruct candidates
for the key, plaintext, and ciphertext, which they use to verify the implementation of
the algorithm and extract its parameters.
6Like Caballero et al.[3], Gro¨bert et al use specific heuristics, with empirically determined
thresholds to perform their detection classification.
The authors also focus on the importance of basic block detection for successful detec-
tion, where a basic block is a sequence of instructions in a given order that has a single
entry and exit point. These are generated from the dynamic trace. Utilizing basic block
detection is suggested as further work for this thesis.
While Lutz, Lin et al., and Wang et al. utilized Valgrind to perform DBI, Gro¨bert et al.
used Intel’s Pin[13] DBI. As the following work most directly relates to that of Gro¨bert
et al., we elected to use used Pin, which is described in further detail in the next section.
This work extends the previous work by utilizing machine learning instead of heuristics
for detection and classification.
Chapter 3
Feature Extraction
3.1 Data
To generate data, small programs were created using open source code with the sole
function of implementing certain cryptographic algorithms, using the OpenSSL imple-
mentation for each algorithm. I trained my models on data generated from the following
cryptographic algorithms:
1. AES (CBC mode)
2. RC4
3. RSA
4. Sha1
5. MD5
6. Triple DES (CBC, CFB, OFB modes)
For encryption algorithms, the programs implemented encryption and decryption. For
the hashing algorithms, two programs were created: one that simply called the hash
function and one that called HMAC implemented with the specific function.
In order to generate enough training data, I then compiled each small program with
different compiler flags and compilers (gcc and clang), along with some programs that
did not contain crypto. This resulted in 317 binary files.
7
83.2 PIN framework
The first task in applying machine learning to this problem is to identify and extract
features. I used Intel’s Pin dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) framework [13] to
generate these features. DBI enables an analyst to examine the behavior of a binary
program at runtime by injecting instrumentation code. As the code executes, DBI tools
analyze what actually occurs, instead of considering what might occur (as in static
binary analysis).
To perform instrumentation, Pin just-in-time (JIT) recompiles fragments of the binary
executable immediately before running it, then inserts the instrumentation code.
Lutz [14] noted that cryptographic algorithms have uncommonly high counts of bitwise
arithmetic instructions and loop executions. Three types of features were generated:
instruction, category, and loop. For the instruction and category features, models were
created that used the proportion of each feature to the total number of instructions in
the program, as well as the raw count. Unlike Gro¨bert et al.[6], here we focus solely on
dynamic features, and do not consider any static features.
3.2.1 Instruction features
It is a simple task to use Pin to track the number of times an individual instruction is
executed. Each value in an instruction feature vector corresponds to either the count or
the proportion of each individual instruction to the total number of instructions.
3.2.2 Category features
Pin classifies instructions into categories, such as NOP, SYSCALL, BINARY, STRINGOP.
For this feature vector, instead of tracking the counts of individual instructions, we
tracked the instruction categories. Since cryptographic algorithms have disproportion-
ately high counts of arithmetic instructions, the goal for this feature set was to capture
this at a higher level than examining individual instruction counts.
93.2.3 Loop features
I utilized an open source Pin tool to detect loops using the instruction counter [17], and
recorded the number of times the loop was executed. Initial testing revealed that there
were only 8 instructions that were repeatedly looped over in the crypto examples 1 :
1. push qword ptr [addr]
2. jmp qword ptr [addr]
3. repne scasb byte ptr [reg]
4. add x, y
5. lea x, y
6. not x
7. and x, y
8. jz addr
3.3 Feature extraction results
When training the models, either the instruction features or the category features were
used to avoid redundancy. Any information learned from the individual instructions
should be encapsulated in the category features, so we then compared the models gener-
ated from each type to determine whether the high granularity of the instruction features
was justified given the larger (19x) vector size.
Two sets of each feature type were also generated, one which stored the raw count per
instruction/category, and one which stored the proportion of the instruction count to
all of the instructions. Intuitively, the proportional features should be more informative
than raw counts.
3.3.1 Timing Analysis
Due to the small size of the training set as well as the sparse nature of the feature
vectors, model training was fast (less than 1 second per model). Feature extraction
1One additional loop feature that could be of interest would be bigrams of instructions, that is,
seeing what instructions are executed sequentially. It could also be interesting to consider a simple cross
product of instruction/category features and loop features
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required significantly more time. The average time to process features was slightly over
3 seconds. The feature extraction processing was evaluated on 169 training files. There
were some failures where Pin failed to extract loop features.
Feature type Average processing time (seconds) Total failures
Instruction 1.779 0
Category 1.444 0
Loop 1.654 59
Table 3.1: Summary of processing failures and timing analysis for feature extraction
Chapter 4
Machine Learning
4.1 Models
Three types of models were implemented:
1. Detection model
2. Type classification model
3. Algorithm classification model
The first model classified examples as having crypto versus not having crypto. The
second determined if the crypto present is encryption or hashing, and the third tried to
classify it as a particular algorithm. For evaluation, I implemented each model under
all four learning algorithms detailed below.
4.2 Framework
To perform machine learning on extracted features, I utilized the scikit-learn [16] package
for Python.
4.3 Supervised Learning
4.3.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
A linear SVM for binary classification processes labeled training data in order to define
a hyperplane that separates the two classes. While there are many hyperplanes that
11
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could separate the data, the best is accepted to be the hyperplane that creates the
largest separation between the two classes, or the maximum margin. This relies on the
assumption that the data are linearly separable. Once the SVM is trained, the model
stores a weight vector λ such that an unbiased hyperplane takes the form λTx = 0.
The classifiers will take the form
yˆ =
n∑
i=1
λiK(x, xi) (4.1)
In order to properly represent possibly nonlinear data, we can use a linear SVM with a
kernel function, K(x, x′). We transform the data x with some basis function φ(x), which
projects the data into a higher dimensional space, where it will be separability can be
achieved. This allows nonlinear classification in a parametric linear framework.
The detection and type classification models are both binary classification problems,
while the algorithm classification model is a multi-class problem. For this, we used
scikit-learn’s SVC class, which implements a one-versus-one model [8], and results in
n(n− 1)/2 pairwise binary classifiers for n classes.
4.3.2 Kernels
Scikit-learn supports 4 different kernel functions: radial-basis functions (RBF), linear,
polynomial, and sigmoid functions. The default parameters provided by scikit-learn
were used, so improved performance could potentially be achieved by optimizing them.
RBF : This is a Gaussian kernel. Given two samples x, y
K(x, y) = exp
(
−|| x− y ||
2
2σ2
)
Linear : This is the simplest kernel function
K(x, y) = xT y + c
Polynomial : The default degree for this kernel is 3. Given two samples x, y,
K(x, y) = (αxT y + c)d
Sigmoid : This kernel originated from the neural networks field, and performs well in
practice
K(x, y) = tanh(αxT y + c)
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4.3.3 Naive Bayes
In a naive Bayes model, we assume that all features are conditionally independent from
each other. Despite this strong assumption, in practice, naive Bayes classifiers perform
very well, particularly in document classification problems.
Two types of naive Bayes classifiers were evaluated: Gaussian and multinomial. The
Gaussian implementation assumes that the continuous values adhere to a Gaussian dis-
tribution, and given the mean and variance of the feature vectors in each class c, we
compute the probability distribution of a feature vector given a class.
p(x = v | c) = 1√
2piσcc
e
− (v−µc)
2
2σ2c (4.2)
The multinomial model is often used in document classification. Features in the current
work were considered to be similar to those in a text document, where data are either
represented as word vector counts or tf-idf features (term frequency and inverse docu-
ment frequency). In this scenario, the number of times an instruction was executed was
considered analogous to a word count. Despite this, multinomial naive Bayes performed
significantly worse than the Gaussian variant (detailed in chapter 5). The likelihood of
observing a feature vector x in class Ck,
p(x | Ck) = (
∑
i
xi)!∏
i
xi!
∏
i
pxi
ki
(4.3)
To assign a classification label, the model picks the class that maximizes the probability
that a testing instance xi belongs to class Ck
yˆ = argmax
k∈{1...K}
p(Ck)
n∏
i=1
p(xi | Ck) (4.4)
4.3.4 Decision Tree
As opposed to naive Bayes and SVMs, a decision tree implements non-parametric learn-
ing. Instead of training certain parameters, the model learns decision rules from the
training features.
Each internal node is a decision rule, and the leaf nodes are classes. By filtering a feature
pattern through the nodes, the model reaches a classification decision.
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4.4 Unsupervised Learning
4.4.1 K-means Clustering
Given a predefined value k, this algorithm partitions the data into k clusters without
the use of labels by minimizing the within-cluster sum of squares (Euclidean distance):
argmin
C
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
|| x− µi ||2 (4.5)
To evaluate the accuracy of this method, the clustered data is compared to the labeled
data to determine if instances were clustered appropriately.
Given a dataset with well-defined classes, the choice of k was straightforward. The first
two models were characterized in terms of a binary classification problem, so k = 2. For
the third task, the number of clusters depends on the number of suspected algorithms in
the evaluation set. Given a priori knowledge that the current set contained 6 algorithms,
the k-means algorithm was set to create 6 clusters. In practice, the true or optimal value
of k is not easily determined.
Scikit-learn uses Lloyd’s algorithm [12] to solve the k-means problem.
Chapter 5
Experimental Evaluation
All experiments were run on an Ubuntu virtual machine with 1 processor core and 1024
MB of memory.
5.1 Measures
5.1.1 Supervised learning
The supervised algorithms were evaluated in two ways: cross-validation within the orig-
inal dataset and validation on a separate dataset.
Cross-validation: Three-fold cross-validation was used to evaluate each model; 3 folds
were used instead of the more common 10 due to the small size of the dataset. The
training data were split into 3 equally sized partitions, with 2 subsets used to train the
model, and the remaining subset used for validation. This was repeated 3 times and
producesd 3 different accuracy scores, which were then averaged.
Validation on separate data: In addition to using cross-validation on the original
training set for evaluation, we used separate testing data. Initially, the models were
tested against real-world, multipurpose programs; however, they performed poorly, due
to the difference in scope between the training and testing data. Then, the models were
tested against the same small, single-purpose programs that had been compiled with a
separate compiler.
We believe that this testing dataset was too similar to the training data, leading to
overly optimistic results on the testing data.
15
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To test Model 1, open source implementations of various crypto algorithms were aggre-
gated, as well as programs that do not contain crypto.
To test Models 2 and 3, the training set was compiled first with gcc, then with clang.
Each program in the dataset is single-purpose and only implements the cryptographic
algorithm to emulate the idea of a basic block and isolate the crypto.
After fitting the model, three measures of correctness were evaluated: precision, recall,
and f1-score (averaged over all classes). Consider the true positives (tp), true negatives
(tn), false positives (fp), and false negatives (fn).
Precision : High precision indicates that the model returns more relevant results than
irrelevant
tp
(tp + fp)
Recall : High recall indicates that the model returns most of the relevant results
tp
(tp+ fn)
F1-score : The harmonic mean of the precision and real
f1 = 2× (precision × recall)/(precision + recall)
5.1.2 Unsupervised learning
To evaluate the models generated by k-means clustering, three metrics were applied:
homogeneity, completeness, and v-score 1. Given true class assignments of samples,
these metrics measure how well the data were partitioned.
Homogeneity : A cluster is homogeneous (value = 1.0) if all clusters contain data
points which belong to a single class
Completeness : A cluster is complete (value = 1.0) if all data points of a class are
elements of the same cluster
V-score : The harmonic mean between homogeneity and completeness
v = 2× (homogeneity × completeness)/(homogeneity + completeness)
1Other metrics such as the Silhouette Score of the stability analysis in Lange et al. [10] would be
more appropriate in scenarios when the true k is not known.
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5.2 Experimental Results
5.2.1 SVM kernel Results
To determine the optimal kernel function, 3-fold cross-validation was performed on a
dataset that consisted of 317 total training files. These were compiled with two different
compilers (gcc and clang) and a variety of compiler options. The default parameter
values assigned by scikit-learn were used. As shown in Table 5.1, the linear kernel has
the best overall performance.
The remainder of the results are derived from the SVM with a linear kernel.
Kernel Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Average
Linear .98 .94 .92 .95
RBF .96 .90 .76 .87
Polynomial .98 .94 .84 .92
Sigmoid .96 .59 .29 .62
Table 5.1: The accuracy of each SVM kernel function on each model
5.2.2 Feature type results
Each model was evaluated on 4 feature types (category vs. instruction and count vs.
proportion) to determine the optimal feature set, as seen in Table 5.2. In the clustering
task, the counting features performed nearly twice as well as the proportional features,
while proportional features performed better on the classification task. There was no
significant difference in the overall performance between instruction and category fea-
tures. This is not unexpected, as the category feature would encapsulate the instruction
feature.
For the remainder of the results, we will focus on results from the proportional and
categorical feature set for the classification task, and the counting and instruction feature
set for the clustering task.
18
Count/ins Count/cat Prop/ins Prop/cat
Avg. cross-validation .939 .927 .987 .984
Avg. f1-score .860 .837 .961 .972
Avg. v-score .460 .460 .253 .255
Table 5.2: Summary of feature set performance as measured by average cross-
validation score, f1-score, and v-score
Algorithm Precision/Homogeneity Recall/Completeness F1-score/V-score
SVM 1 1 1
Naive Bayes 1 .97 .99
Decision Tree 1 1 1
K-means 1 1 1
Table 5.3: Summary of classification/clustering results for a model that classifies a
binary program as containing crypto or not (Model 1)
Algorithm Precision/Homogeneity Recall/Completeness F1-score/V-score
SVM 1 1 1
Naive Bayes .92 .9 .9
Decision Tree 1 1 1
K-means 0 1 0
Table 5.4: Summary of classification/clustering results for a model that classifies a
binary program that contains crypto as having encryption or hashing (Model 2)
5.2.3 Model 1: Cryptographic detection binary classifier
The results for detecting cryptographic algorithms with each different machine learning
algorithm are shown in Table 5.3. It is possible that the testing data were too similar
to the training data, and not general enough, resulting in biased results.
5.2.4 Model 2: Cryptographic algorithm type binary classifier
The results for classifying algorithms as encryption or hashing with each different ma-
chine learning algorithm are shown in Table 5.4.
5.2.5 Model 3: Cryptographic algorithm multiclass classifier
The results for classifying each cryptographic algorithm with each different machine
learning algorithm are shown in Table 5.5.
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Algorithm Precision/Homogeneity Recall/Completeness F1-score/V-score
SVM 1 1 1
Naive Bayes .83 .9 .86
Decision Tree 1 1 1
K-means .26 .71 .38
Table 5.5: Summary of classification/clustering results for a model that classifies a
binary program that contains crypto as belonging to one of five pre-specified algorithms
(Model 3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
SVM .984 .944 .927
Naive Bayes .741 .897 .779
Decision Tree .984 .993 .987
Table 5.6: cross-validation results for each model and classification algorithm
5.2.6 Discussion
These results demonstrate that the best SVM kernel function for this problem is a
linear kernel, and that while proportional and categorical features work best for the
classification task, it is better to use counting and instructional features for the clustering
task. As shown in Table 5.6, the decision tree models perform the best in cross-validation
testing.
It is likely that the testing data are too similar to the training data, implying that the
models work perfectly. In this case, we can utilize on the results of cross-validation over
the entire training set (using both gcc and clang for compilation) to conclude that the
models will likely generalize given test data that are less similar to the training data.
Additionally, Model 1 would benefit from training on more non-cryptographic examples,
due to bias from cross-validating with unequal numbers of samples per class.
When the models were evaluated on larger real-world programs, they performed very
poorly, likely due to the difference in scale of the training and testing examples. While
the current models are trained on very small programs that perform a specific task, real-
world examples will be large programs that perform many tasks. In order to succeed on
these real-world examples, further work is needed.
Chapter 6
Limitations
This method relies on dynamic analysis using Pin for feature extraction. If the code
of interest is not executed during instrumentation, then it will not be analyzed and
extracted. Therefore, we must assume that the cryptographic code is always executed.
However, if malware can detect the presence of the Pin instrumentation code, it would
be able to avoid executing this code and thus avoid detection. As mentioned in [6], using
a more robust malware analysis framework for feature extraction could solve this.
In this thesis, only C/C++ compiled code has been examined. If an attacker uses a lan-
guage such as Python, analysis would become complicated. However, once appropriate
features are identified and extracted, it would not be difficult to train models to detect
and classify crypto in Python binaries.
6.1 Model limitations
As discussed in the previous chapter, the results suggest that a decision tree is the best
learning algorithm for the data. However, decision trees easily overfit data, and can be
sensitive to small changes in the data. They also tend to work best on fewer classes, so
if training were performed on a larger set of cryptographic algorithms, it is possible that
the model would break down.
To improve this model, further work could involve using a boosted decision tree, which
Kolter and Maloof concluded was the best classifier for their work[9].
A model that produced comparable results on these experiments, but might generalize
better to more algorithms and more realistic data is the SVM with a linear kernel.
Further work on optimizing the default scikit-learn parameters would be required.
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6.2 Further Work
In order to evaluate this on real-world examples, the test programs should be partitioned
into basic blocks, then features extracted from those. Then, the models should be
evaluated on the feature set block by block. This technique will extend this methodology
to more general testing examples, and have the added benefit of identifying where in the
program binary the crypto occurs, as well as finding multiple instances of it in a single
binary.
Additionally, very simple loop features were extracted. Possible improvements could be
made by using the loop detection algorithm from Tubella and Gonza`lez [18] or LoopProf
from Moseley, et. al[15].
To increase the usefulness of these models, they should be trained on additional en-
cryption and hashing algorithms, as well as examples from crypto libraries in addition
to OpenSSL. This should allow the models to detect a wider variety of cryptographic
algorithms.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis examined the process of extracting features and training machine learning
models for the detection and classification of cryptographic algorithms in compiled code.
Three different types of models were evaluated on four different feature sets using four
different learning algorithms. While the decision tree models were found to perform the
best on these data, due to certain limitations of decision trees, it is possible that an
SVM with a linear kernel will generalize better to real-world data.
Cross-validation results suggest that algorithm classification and detection will be over
95% accurate, given a relatively small and homogeneous sample. Furthermore, once this
method has been implemented such that it examines the basic blocks of larger programs,
it will be able to identify where in the binary program the crypto algorithm is executed,
further simplifying the reverse engineer’s task.
Further work is required to fully test these models in real world applications. However,
this thesis demonstrates that it will be possible for machine learning algorithms to
automatically detect and classify cryptographic primitives in binary code. This approach
has the potential to outperform manual strategies in terms of both effectiveness and
scalability.
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